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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.
Does a state act consistently with the eighth and fourteenth
amendments when it finds a convicted murderer competent for
execution where he both understands the nature of the death penalty
and the reasons he faces it?
2.
Does a state’s legitimate right to enforce its criminal
justice system override a convicted murderer's limited interest in
refusing antipsychotic medication, thereby rendering himself
incompetent to undergo execution?
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OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Louisiana Supreme Court is reported at
State V. Perry, 502 So.2d 543 (La. 1986).
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Petitioner seeks review of the judgment of the Louisiana
Supreme Court entered on May 12, 1989, denying petitioner's
appeal or, in the alternative, application for writ of certiorari
to the Louisiana Supreme Court.

The Louisiana Supreme Court

denied a petition for rehearing on June 16, 1989.

Petitioner's

timely petition for writ of certiorari to this honorable Court
was granted on March 5, 1990.

The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. section 1257(a).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
This case involves the eighth and fourteenth amendments to
the United States Constitution, and article 641 of the Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1983 Michael Owen Perry was indicted on five counts of
first degree murder.

All five victims were members of his

family, including his parents and a two year old nephew.

A jury

of his peers unanimously concluded that Mr. Perry was guilty as
charged on all five counts.

In view of the aggravating

circumstances surrounding the murders, including the heinous
manner in which they were committed, the jury unanimously
requested that Mr. Perry be sentenced to death on each count.
State

V.

Perry, 502 So,2d 543, 545-546 (La. 1986).
1

Mr. Perry's

conviction and sentence are not at issue on petition before this
Court.
Since his conviction and sentencing, Mr. Perry's competency
to stand for execution has been called into question by Mr.
Perry’s counsel, who applied to the trial court for a sanity
hearing.

(J.A. 5.)

The trial court appointed a sanity

commission to aid it in its factual determination of Mr. Perry's
competency for execution.

(J-A. B.)

Each member of the sanity

commission diagnosed Mr. Perry as having Schizoaffective
Disorder, a thinking disorder characterized by periodic
delusions, loose associations, manic phases and paranoia.
16-18, 21, 55, 98, 145.)

(J.A.

Mr. Perry has manifested several

symptoms of the Disorder, including delusions, paranoia,
incohesive thinking and auditory hallucinations.
22.)

(J.A. 19-20.

For example, he exhibited disruptive behavior,

restlessness, hallucinations of voices, and a belief that he was
God.

(J.A. 159-160.)
The trial court agreed with Dr. Cox, a sanity commission

member, that Haldol is the most effective treatment for
Schizoaffective Disorder.

(J.A. 297.)

Haldol is a commonly

prescribed treatment used to increase the cohesiveness of the
thinking process, reduce paranoia and aid in the patient’s
concentration level.
beneficially."

(J.A. 24.)

(J.A. 60.)

Haldol "affects [Mr. Perry]

The medication "[m]akes his thinking

become more coherent and rational, it makes his delusional
beliefs either go away or become much less compelling or
2

controlling.

If he's hallucinating it will suppress or cease the

hallucinations.

. .

(J.A. 74.)

It also makes Mr. Perry

”[l]ess hostile, less aggressive. . . .

(J.A. 74.)

Further,

when on Haldol, "he was able to distinguish right from wrong."
(J.A, 72.)

One doctor testified that, ''[w]hen he's on medication

I think he's competent, when he's not I don’t think he is."
(J.A. 77.)
Dr. Kovac, medical director of the Louisiana State
Penitentiary at Angola where Mr. Perry is imprisoned, testified
that it is in Mr. Perry's "best health" that he take Haldol.
(J.A. 224.)

Dr. Jimenez, another sanity commission member,

stated that she would "feel more comfortable if [Mr. Perry] were
better medicated. . .

(J.A. 39.)

However, Mr. Perry's

defense counsel has instructed him to refuse medication.

(J.A.

77, 224.)
There was conflicting testimony as to whether Mr. Perry
experienced side effects as a result of taking Haldol.

Dr. Kovac

testified that Mr. Perry reported mild discomfort from the Haldol
injections.
burn."

Mr. Perry told her that the injections "make his hip

(J.A. 225.)

Dr. Jimenez testified that Mr. Perry

experienced stiffness and drooling, but she warned that Mr. Perry
"exaggerated" some of the symptoms.

(J.A. 24.)

The trial court,

however, accorded Dr. Cox's testimony the greatest weight and
found that Mr. Perry experienced no side effects.

(J.A. 285.)

Mr. Perry periodically exhibits psychotic symptoms even when
he takes the medication.

(J.A. 62.)
3

However, even while

manifesting psychotic behavior, Mr. Perry has shown an
understanding of both the nature of the death penalty and the
reasons for his sentence.

(J.A. 16, 30, 36, 56, 62.)

He

understands that the execution process will result in his death.
(J.A. 62, 72, 252.)

Dr. Jimenez testified that Mr. Perry

expressed his fear of death.

(J.A. 30.)

Dr. Jimenez also stated

that Mr. Perry understood he would suffer the death penalty
because he )cilled five members of his family.

(J.A. 30, 36,

265.)
The procedure at the Louisiana Department of Corrections
allows a competent patient to make his or her own treatment
decisions.

(J.A. 60.)

However, if the patient’s mental

condition deteriorates to the point where [s]he is "gravely
disabled," then the Department may forcibly medicate the patient.
(J.A. 60.)

In the instant case, Haldol has made Mr. Perry

competent enough, according to Department of Corrections
standards, to refuse medication.

(J.A. 60.)

However, when off

the Haldol, Mr. Perry’s condition deteriorates quickly.
59.)

(J.A.

One doctor noted that Mr. Perry makes a connection between

his refusal to take medication and the ability to avoid
execution: "it's very simple to understand, take my pills and
die, don't take my pills and live. ... so, I'm not going to
take my pills."

(J.A. 224.)

After hearing the testimony of the sanity commission
members, the state trial court judge, as fact finder, determined
that (1) Mr. Perry is competent for purposes of execution while
4

medicated; and,

(2) Mr. Perry is aware of his punishment and the

reason he is to suffer the death penalty.

(J.A. 296, 298.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should explicitly adopt the competency standard
articulated by Justice Powell and used by Louisiana.

The Court

has already implicitly embraced the standard, and the standard
satisfies moral and philosophical concerns against executing the
insane.

Justice Powell’s competency for execution standard

requires that the defendant understand both the nature of the
death penalty and the reasons he has been sentenced to face it.
Ford

V.

Wainwriqht. 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986)

(Powell, J.,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

Two of the

court-appointed doctors, who evaluated Mr. Perry during his
treatment, agreed that when medicated with Haldol, Mr. Perry
fulfills both prongs of Justice Powell’s test.

(J.A. 30, 56.)

The trial court judge concurred with the opinions of the doctors:
"[i]t is obvious to this Court that the defendant is competent
for execution.

. - . while maintained on psychotropic medication

in the form of Haldol.”

(J.A. 296.)

The Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment does not
require a higher degree of reliability than that provided for by
Justice Powell’s standard.

Ford, 477 U.S. at 429 (O’Connor and

White, JJ., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in
part).

To require a higher standard than Justice Powell’s test

would be to effectively eliminate the death penalty as a means of
punishment, since more rigid guidelines for imposing the death
5

penalty would place impracticable conditions on its use.
V.

Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976).

Gregg

More specifically,

this Court should not require as part of Louisiana's competency
standard that the defendant be able to assist counsel; the
ability to do so is required neither by Louisiana law nor the Due
Process Clause.

LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 641; Ford, 477

U.S. at 413 (majority opinion)

("minimal degree of reliability is

required for the protection of any constitutional interest").
The fact finder's determination that Mr. Perry is competent
must be accorded deference where the record fairly supports the
findings.
curiam).

Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. Ill, 117 (1983)

(per

In addition to deferring to state courts' factual

determinations, this Court also recognizes the limited role
federal courts should play in applying the eighth amendment to
states' laws.

Gregg, 428 U.S. at 174 (Stewart, Powell and

Stevens, JJ., concurring).
A policy allowing states to forcibly medicate death row
inmates in order to make the inmates competent to undergo
execution comports with substantive due process requirements set
forth by this Court in Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028,
1039-1040 (1990).
where it is;
interest;

A forcible medication policy is constitutional

(1) reasonably related to a legitimate state

(2) a rational and effective means of furthering that

interest; and,

(3) in the inmate's medical interest.

Id.

There

can be little doubt as to the legitimacy of a state's interest in
enforcing its criminal justice system.
6

To allow a convicted

murderer to refuse medication, thereby rendering himself
incompetent to face the death penalty rightfully imposed upon
him, is to sanction the gradual erosion of respect for criminal
law.

Accordingly, the forcible medication of an incompetent

death row inmate, where in the inmate's medical interest, is a
rational means of furthering a state's interest in maintaining
the integrity of its criminal justice system.
Forcible medication is not cruel and unusual punishment.
The eighth amendment prohibits "excessive" punishments.
428 U.S. at 173.

Gregg,

Inquiry into "excessiveness" has two aspects:

the punishment (1) "must not involve the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain;" and,

(2) "must not be grossly out of

proportion to the crime."

Id.

Furthermore, this constitutional

test "is intertwined with an assessment of contemporary standards
and the legislative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining such
standards."

Id. at 175.

Forcible medication,

where in the

patient’s medical interest, can hardly be labelled punishment.
However, if determined punishment, forcible medication under the
circumstances of the present case, is not cruel and unusual by
eighth amendment standards.
Forcibly medicating an inmate, where there are no reasonable
alternatives, certainly is not "unnecessary and wanton."
Moreover, forcible medication is not "grossly" disproportionate
to the crime where used to facilitate the penalty rightfully
imposed.

Finally, use of forcible medication where necessary to

further a legitimate state interest comports with contemporary
7

standards.

This is evidenced by the numerous state legislatures

which have adopted forcible medication policies under
circumstances analogous to the instant case.
ARGUMENT
I. A COMPETENCY STANDARD THAT REQUIRES THAT DEFENDANT UNDERSTAND
BOTH THE FACT OF HIS IMPENDING EXECUTION AND THE REASONS FOR
IT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS.
The eighth amendment of the Constitution, which prohibits
cruel and unusual punishment, is not violated by the execution of
Mr. Perry.

A punishment passes eighth amendment scrutiny when it

conforms to ‘‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society."

Trop v. Dulles 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).

Because the test under which Mr. Perry was found competent
comports with evolving standards of decency, the state trial
court's determination of his competency for execution should be
upheld.
This Court repeatedly has interpreted the eighth amendment as
giving states the right to impose the death penalty on inmates
convicted of capital crimes, as long as certain procedural
reguirements are met.
284 (1976)

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,

(plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,

188-189 (1976)
242, 247 (1976)

(plurality opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
(plurality opinion).

The amendment's prohibition

against cruel and unusual punishment does, however, preclude
states from imposing the death penalty on incompetent defendants.
Ford V. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986)

(majority opinion).

Although this Court deems execution of insane inmates to be an
8

eighth amendment violation, it has never explicitly adopted a
constitutional standard for determining an insane prisoner's
competency for execution.

We urge this Court to expressly adopt

Justice Powell's standard articulated in Ford, which posits that
an inmate is competent for execution when he understands both the
nature of the death penalty and the reasons he has been sentenced
to face it.

Id. at 422.

Louisiana models its competency

standard after Justice Powell's test.
A. Justice Powell's competency standard comports with evolving
standards of decency because it has been implicitly adopted
by this Court and satisfies society's moral concern about
executing the insane.
This Court should find that the standard articulated by
Justice Powell and used by Louisiana comports with evolving
standards of decency, because the Court has already implicitly
embraced the standard, and because the test satisfies concerns
against executing the insane.

Id. at 417, 419-421.

Justice

Powell's competency standard finds implicit support from the Ford
majority: "[i]t is... abhorrent... to exact in penance the life
of one whose mental illness prevents him from comprehending the
reasons for the penalty or its implicationsId.

(emphasis added).

at 417

The majority suggests that the prisoner must

have the capacity to understand that he has been sentenced to
death because of his crime and that he will die as a result of
the execution of the sentence.
A plurality of this Court gave Justice Powell's test explicit
support by citing it as the standard for determining competency
for execution.

Penry v. Lvnauah, 109 S, Ct. 2934, 2954 (1989).
9

Although Penry concerned the execution of a mentally retarded
inmate, the concern that prisoners facing execution have "the
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions," Id.,
is identical with respect to insane inmates.

The plurality’s

citation of Powell’s standard in the context of a retarded
defendant suggests its recognition that the standard satisfies a
concern that the defendant understand the wrongfulness of his
actions.
Two justices gave further support for Justice Powell’s
competency standard.

Justices Marshall and Brennan repeated the

standard under facts identical to the present case, in which the
issue of competency for execution was raised after conviction and
sentencing.

Johnson v. Cabana, 481 U.S. 1061, 1061“1062 (1987)

(Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).

Because this Court has repeatedly cited Justice

Powell’s test with approval, we urge this Court to explicitly
adopt it as a minimum standard for determining an inmate's
competency for execution.
Justice Powell’s competency standard comports with prevailing
standards of decency because it allays moral and philosophical
concerns about inadvertently executing the insane.
U.S. at 422.

Ford, 477

The eighth amendment prohibition against executing

incompetent inmates derives from two modern social concerns.
First, society is interested in allowing a condemned prisoner to
prepare for his death spiritually and emotionally.

Secondly,

limiting use of the death penalty to sane prisoners preserves
10

retribution, a critical justification for the death penalty.
at 421.

Id.

By requiring that the inmate understand the implications

of the death penalty, the standard satisfies society's concern
that the defendant have the capacity to prepare for his death,
both emotionally and spiritually.

Secondly, the standard

fulfills a crucial purpose for the state's imposition of the
death penalty, retribution, by ensuring that the prisoner
understand that the purpose of the sentence is punishment for his
crimes.

Id.

B. The defendant in this case meets the requirements of
Justice Powell's competency standard.
The court-appointed doctors who evaluated Mr, Perry during
treatment agreed that when treated with Haldol, Mr. Perry
fulfills both prongs of Justice Powell's test.

With respect to

the first prong of the standard, comprehension of the finality of
the death penalty, Mr. Perry demonstrated his understanding on
several occasions.

For instance, he expressed to Dr. Jimenez

that he does not want to die.

(J.A. 30.)

Furthermore, he has

repeatedly expressed an awareness that he could be killed by
electrocution: "I directly asked him if electrocution would kill
him and he said yes, he knew it would."

(J.A. 252; see also J.A.

72.)
Regarding the second prong of Justice Powell's test, Mr. Perry
has repeatedly demonstrated his awareness of the reasons for his
punishment.

Doctors Jimenez, and Cox both testified that he

comprehends the correlation between the murders he committed and
the sentence imposed for them.

(J.A, 30, 56.)
11

In graphic

illustration of such understanding, Mr. Perry compared his own
sentence for murder to Charles Manson's: "he was questioning the
fact as to why Charles Manson had people killed, or killed some
people, and he was not being executed and why, why (Perry], who
killed five people should be executed."

(J.A. 265.)

Furthermore, he demonstrated a capacity to distinguish right from
wrong.

(J.A. 72.)

The trial court agreed with Drs. Cox and

Jimenez and found that, "it is obvious to this Court that the
defendant is competent for execution. . . . while maintained on
psychotropic medication in the form of Haldol."

(J.A. 296.)

C. Requiring a higher standard to determine competency than
Justice Powell's two-pronged test would encourage false
claims, waste judicial and government resources, and is
required neither by Louisiana law nor the Due Process
Clause.
The Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment does not
require a higher degree of reliability than that provided for in
Justice Powell's standard, in light of the unique lack of
finality that attends the issue of competency.

As Justices

O'Connor and White expressed, "[b]y definition, this interest [in
suspending the death penalty during incompetency] can never be
conclusively and finally determined.

Regardless of the number of

prior adjudications of the issue, until the very moment of
execution the prisoner can claim that he has become insane
sometime after the previous determination to the contrary."
Ford, 477 U.S. at 429 (emphasis in original).
Additionally, to require a higher standard than Justice
Powell's test would be to effectively eliminate the death penalty
12

as a means of punishment, since more rigid guidelines for
imposing the death penalty would place impracticable conditions
on its use.

Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199 n.50.

States have several

compelling interests at stake that would be thwarted by a higher
competency standard.

First, states have a compelling interest in

upholding their justice systems and executing the sentence of a
prisoner properly condemned.

Ford, 477 U.S. at 425.

A higher

standard would only thwart the state’s interest and cause a
proliferation of false claims and delay tactics.

Id. at 429.

In

spite of the theoretically limited due process rights accorded to
post-conviction inmates. Id., the state’s criminal justice
system, prosecutorial and judicial resources would be at the
mercy of inmates’ groundless claims of incompetency.
Furthermore, states have a legitimate interest in preserving
judicial and governmental resources:
a standard that focused on the defendant’s ability to
assist in his defense would give too little weight to
the State's interest in finality, since it implies a
constitutional right to raise new challenges to one’s
criminal conviction until a sentence has run its course
.... States have a strong and legitimate interest in
avoiding repetitive collateral review through
procedural bars.
Id. at 421 n.2.

Accordingly, a higher standard of

competency than Justice Powell's test should not be required
because of both the lack of finality that attends competency
determinations, and the enormous risk of false claims.
This Court should not require as part of Louisiana's
competency standard that the defendant be able to assist counsel,
because the ability to do so is neither required by Louisiana law
13

nor the Due Process Clause.

Louisiana requires that a defendant

have the ability to assist counsel in his defense.
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 641.

LA. CODE

The Court should not expand the plain

language of the statute to require the defendant’s post
conviction ability to assist counsel.

This Court has held that

where a statute mandates, in "language of an unmistakable
mandatory character,*' that the state will act against an
individual’s interests only if "specified substantive predicates"
are satisfied, procedural due process requires that such
"predicates" be enforced.
(1983).

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-472

Here, by contrast, the plain language of the statute in

question does not require the ability to assist counsel at post
conviction hearings; it merely prescribes that the defendant be
able to assist in his own defense, ie., at trial.
Furthermore, the Due Process Clause does not require the
ability to assist counsel after conviction, because to do so
would surpass the minimal reliability requirements of procedural
due process.

A mere "minimal degree of reliability [is] required

for the protection of any constitutional interest."
U.S. at 413.

Ford, 477

The procedural safeguards that Louisiana uses in

its competency evaluation process ensure that reliability is
achieved.
Louisiana's procedural safeguards clearly surpass the minimal
procedural requirements enumerated by Ford.

In Ford, the

majority focused on the defendant's lack of opportunity to submit
written material relevant to the issue of his sanity, cross14

examine the psychiatrists who evaluated him, and have the issue
determined by a court, as the reasons that defendant was denied
procedural due process.

Id. at 413-416.

Here, in contrast, the

trial court allowed Mr. Perry’s counsel to submit all relevant
written evidence and cross-examine the psychiatrists; further,
the determination of competency was made by a judge.

Therefore,

by satisfying the due process concerns articulated in Ford,
Louisiana's application of Justice Powell's standard satisfies
due process without requiring the ability to assist counsel at a
competency hearing.
Finally, the ability to assist counsel should not be required
because the rationale for requiring that defendant have such
ability, that he may have knowledge of information that could
exonerate him or lighten his sentence, is not applicable here.
Id. at 419-420.

This rationale applies only to the guilt

determining and sentencing phases, not with post-conviction
competency proceedings, where guilt is not at issue.
Mr. Perry's counsel represented him competently at a Louisiana
trial court hearing on the issue of his competency.

He exercised

his right to appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court the trial
court's ruling declaring him competent.

Thus, Mr. Perry's

representation by competent counsel at his several levels of
judicial review have ensured that, "[ijt is thus unlikely indeed
that a defendant today could go to his death with knowledge of
undiscovered trial error that might set him free."

Id. at 420.

Accordingly, this Court should not require that the defendant
15

possess the ability to assist counsel, because the traditional
rationale for requiring such ability is inapplicable to the
present stage of proceedings.
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Perry need not have the ability
to assist counsel.

However, even if this Court were to

establish such a requirement, Mr. Perry would satisfy it.

Dr.

Cox, of the sanity commission, and Dr. Kovac, the prison medical
director, both testified that Mr. Perry refused to take his
prescribed medication at the advice of his attorney.
224.)

(J.A. 77,

He did so even though Haldol is in his "best health."

(J.A. 224.)

By refusing to take his medication, he understands

that he is following the advice of his counsel and avoiding the
sentence rightfully imposed upon him: "it’s very simple to
understand, take my pills and die, don't take my pills and live.
. . so. I'm not going to take my pills,"

(J.A. 224.)

Thus, Mr.

Perry possesses the ability to assist in his counsel’s strategy
for avoiding punishment.
D. This Court owes deference to both the factual conclusions
of the trial court and the legal standard adopted by
Louisiana.
The state trial court's determination that Mr. Perry was
competent must be accorded deference by federal courts where the
record fairly supports the trial court's findings.
Fulford, 462 U.S. Ill, 117 (1983)

(per curiam).

Maqgio v.

In Maggio. this

Court reversed a federal court of appeals' decision to overturn a
Louisiana trial court ruling that defendant was competent to
stand trial.

Id. at 112-113.

The Court reasoned that the issue
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of competency is a factual conclusion that may only be overturned
when the factual determination is not "fairly" supported by the
record.

id. at 117. Here, as in Maggio, the trial court's

^®^6rmination that Mr. Perry is competent for execution must be
accorded the deference owed to a factual conclusion.

The court-

appointed doctors' repeated conclusions that Mr. Perry is
competent for execution under Justice Powell's standard gave the
Louisiana trial court more than ample support for its finding
that Mr. Perry is competent.

(J.A. 30, 56.)

Accordingly, this

Court should defer to and affirm the Louisiana trial court's
factual determination.
In addition to deferring to state courts' factual
determinations, this Court also recognizes the limited role the
federal courts should play in applying the eighth amendment to
states* laws.

Gregg. 428 U.S. at 174.

In Gregg, the Court

upheld a Georgia statute's procedural scheme for imposing or
withholding the death penalty at the sentencing phase of trial.
Id. at 207.

Three concurring justices reasoned that, "while we

have an obligation to insure that constitutional bounds are not
overreached, . . . the independence of the judiciary is
jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions of the
day and assume primary responsibility in choosing between
competing political, economic and social pressures."

Id. at 174-

175 (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951)
(Fran)cfurter, J., concurring in affirmance of judgment)).
evaluating the constitutionality of Louisiana's competency
17

In

standard, this Court should apply Gregg because of its factual
similarity; in both cases the states' schemes for determining
whether to withhold the death penalty are mere procedural devices
that deserve deference by this Court.

If the Court were to

choose a competency test based on its own standard of decency, it
would become embroiled in a classic "social pressure" warned
against by Gregg; "[c]aution is necessary lest this Court become
. .

. the ultimate arbiter of the standards of criminal

responsibility . .

. throughout the country."

Id. at 176

(quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968)).
Accordingly, this Court should defer to Louisiana's scheme for
the policy reasons articulated in Gregg.
II.

ALLOWING A STATE TO FORCIBLY MEDICATE A CONVICTED MURDERER
WITH ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS IN ORDER TO MAKE HIM COMPETENT TO
UNDERGO EXECUTION MEETS FOURTEENTH AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT
REQUIREMENTS.
A. The forcible medication of a convicted prisoner comports
with substantive due process where it (1) is reasonably
related to a state's legitimate interest; (2) is a
rational means of furthering that interest; and, (3) is _in
the inmate's medical interest.
A state has a substantial and legitimate interest in executing

a death sentence imposed upon a convicted murderer by the state’s
jury.

Ford, 477 U.S. at 425.

To allow a death row inmate to

refuse antipsychotic treatment, thereby rendering himself
incompetent to undergo execution, is to deny a state the power to
enforce its criminal justice system.

We urge this Court to give

states this right of enforcement by affording them the means of
forcible medication to ma}ce death row inmates competent to face
their sentences.
18

This is a case of forcibly medicating a condemned prisoner
to further a legitimate state interest.

Recently, this Court

addressed an analogous situation in Washington v. Harper, 110 S.
Ct. 1028 (1990).

involved the forcible medication of

violent prisoners in order to ensure prison safety.

In Harper,

this Court set forth the standard for determining whether
forcible medication comports with substantive due process.

That

standard is whether the forcible medication: (1) reasonably
relates to a legitimate state interest; (2) is a rational means
of furthering that interest; and,
interest.

(3) is in the inmate's medical

Id^ at 1037.

Under that standard, this Court determined that Washington's
policy of forcibly medicating prisoners who endanger prison
safety comports with substantive due process requirements.
at 1039-1040.

Id.

This Court found that forcibly medicating a

violent prisoner "reasonably related to the State's legitimate
interest in combating the danger posed by a violent, mentally ill
inmate.

.

interest."

.

.

[and was] a rational means of furthering that

Id. at 1031.

Furthermore, Washington's policy

allowed forcible medication only where in the violent inmate's
medical interest.

Id. at 1040.

We urge this Court to adopt the Harper standard in
evaluating the constitutionality of Louisiana’s proposed policy
of forcibly medicating an incompetent death row inmate to achieve
the inmate’s competency for purposes of execution.

Like the

state of Washington, Louisiana aims to use forcible medication as
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a rational means of furthering a legitimate state interest:
Louisiana seeks to forcibly medicate Mr. Perry, a convicted
murderer, in order to carry out the sentence validly imposed upon
him by a jury of the state.
1. A state has a legitimate interest in enforcing its
criminal justice system.
There can be little doubt as to the legitimacy and importance
of a state’s interest in executing the sentences imposed by its
juries.

In Ford, this Court passed on the issue of whether

Florida could enforce the death penalty against a convicted
murderer who had become insane subsequent to sentencing.

Justice

Powell acknowledged that Florida had "a substantial and
legitimate interest in taking petitioner's life as punishment for
his crime."

Ford. 477 U.S. at 425.

In the present case,

Louisiana has a significant interest in executing the sentence
imposed upon Mr. Perry in order to maintain the integrity of its
criminal justice system and the faith of its citizens in that
system.

To permit Mr. Perry, a convicted murderer, to avoid the

sentence validly imposed upon him by a Louisiana jury, is to
sanction the gradual erosion of respect for Louisiana criminal
law.
2. Forcibly medicating an inmate with antipsychotic
drugs is a rational means of achieving the inmate s
competency to undergo execution.
The forcible medication of a death row inmate with
antipsychotic drugs is a rational means of making the inmate
competent to undergo execution.

Antipsychotic medications are

proven to be an effective means of treating and controlling
20

psychiatric disorders and aiding in an affected patient's
competency.

(J.A. 297.)

Haldol, a commonly prescribed

antipsychotic drug, increases the cohesiveness of the thin)cing
process, reduces paranoia and aids in concentration level.

(J.A.

24. )
In the instant case, forcible medication of Mr. Perry is not
just a rational means of carrying out the sentence imposed upon
him, it is the only means.

As one doctor testified. *'[w]hen [Mr.

Perry) is on medication he's competent, when he's not I don t
think he is."

(J.A. 77.)

More compellingly, Mr. Perry himself

comprehends that in refusing treatment he is effectively avoiding
his sentence.

In an interview with one of his doctors, Mr. Perry

stated, "It's very simple to understand, take my pills and die,
don't take my pills and live. . . so, I'm not going to take my
pills."

(J.A. 224.)

3. Forcibly medicating Mr. Perry with antipsychotic
drugs is in his medical interest.
The trial court found that treatment with Haldol is
appropriate for Mr. Perry's disorder, and that such treatment
affects him beneficially.

(J.A. 297, 24.)

Haldol makes Mr.

Perry more coherent and rational; on Haldol, his thinking process
becomes less delusional and more cohesive.

(J.A. 72, 74.)

In

sum, Haldol aids in Mr. Perry's well-being.
Mr. Perry is not presently taking Haldol, at the advice of his
attorney, not his doctors.

(J.A. 76, 77, 261.)

In fact, Mr,

Perry's doctors have suggested that they would "feel more
comfortable" if he were better medicated, and that the medication
21

is in Mr. Perry’s "best health."

(J.A. 39, 224.)

Clearly,

treatment with Haldol is in Mr. Perry’s medical interest.
The above analysis indicates that Louisiana’s forcible
medication of Mr. Perry, to achieve his competency to undergo
execution, comports with the due process requirements set forth
by this Court in Harper.

Forcibly medicating Mr. Perry with

Haldol is in Mr. Perry’s medical interest.

Moreover, the

forcible medication of Mr. Perry, a convicted murderer: (1) is
reasonably related to Louisiana's legitimate and important
interest in enforcing its criminal justice system; and,

(2) is

the only effective means of carrying out the penalty rightfully
imposed upon Mr. Perry.
In conclusion, this case affords this Court the opportunity to
empower states to enforce their criminal justice systems.

We

urge this Court to allow states to use forcible medication to
make death row inmates competent to face their rightfully imposed
sentences.
B. Mr. Perry’s due process interest in refusing
antipsychotic medication is limited by his position as a
convicted and sentenced murderer.
As stated by Justice O’Connor in Ford, "once society has
validly convicted an individual of a crime and therefore
established its right to punish, the demands of due process are
reduced accordingly.’’

Ford. 477 U.S. 429.

Mr. Perry was

rightfully convicted on five counts of murder and subsequently
sentenced to the death penalty.
545-546 (La. 1986).

State v. Perry, 502 So.2d 543,

Thus, Mr. Perry's due process interests are
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substantially diminished.
The due process interest of an accused in refusing forcible
medication with antipsychotic drugs is addressed in United States
V. Charters, 829 F,2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987).

The Charters Court

implied that a pre-trial accused, still surrounded by a
presumption of innocence, is afforded greater liberty interests
than a convicted inmate in avoiding forcible medication.

The

Charters Court explicitly stated that it was only addressing "the
circumstances of the unconvicted defendant and express[ed] no
views concerning the rights of convicted prisoners. ..."
at 499 n.30.
In Harper, this Court recognized that "the extent of a
prisoner’s right under the [Due Process] Clause to avoid the
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs must be defined in
the context of the inmate's confinement."
1037.

Harper, 110 S. Ct. at

Mr. Harper's interest in refusing antipsychotic treatment

was limited by the fact that, when not medicated, he engaged in
violent conduct and endangered prison safety.

In the instant

case, Mr. Perry becomes incompetent to face his sentence when not
medicated.

(J.A. 77.)

Accordingly, the Court must evaluate Mr.

Perry's interest in refusing medication so as to prevent Mr.
Perry from thwarting the punishment rightfully imposed upon him.
To allow Mr. Perry to refuse medication is to ma)ce Mr. Perry the
final and sole arbiter of his sentence.
Unli)ce the pre-trial accused in Charters, Mr. Perry is no
longer protected by a presumption of innocence.
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Mr. Perry is a

convicted murderer who was unanimously sentenced to death.

Like

the convicted prisoner in Harper, whose limited liberty interests
were further diminished where he threatened prison safety, Mr.
Perry's limited due process interest must also be reduced in view
of his status as a condemned prisoner.

Mr. Perry must not be

afforded the right to refuse antipsychotic treatment where
avoidance of medication would allow total usurpation of the
sentence imposed upon him.
C. Forcible treatment with ^antipsychotic medication is not
cruel_ and unusual punishment .bec_ausa_ it _(_1J is not
excessive; and,_(2) comports with evolving standards o_f
decency.
As established above, forcible treatment of Mr. Perry with
antipsychotic drugs is in his medical interest.

Thus, forcible

medication with Haldol is treatment, not punishment. However, if
forcible medication is determined punishment under the instant
circumstances, it by no means violates eighth amendment standards
of cruel and unusual punishment.
The eighth amendment prohibits "excessive” punishments.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.

Inquiry into "excessiveness" has two

aspects: the punishment (1) "must not involve the unnecessary and
infliction of pain;" and,
to the crime.”

Id.

(2) "must not be grossly out proportion

Furthermore, this test "is intertwined with

an assessment of contemporary standards. . . ."

Id. at 175.

Forcibly medicating Mr. Perry with Haldol does not involve
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.

It is necessary

because, as found by the trial court, -Haldol is the only
effective treatment for Mr. Perry— there is no reasonable
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alternative.

(J.A. 297.)

It is not wanton because Mr. Perry

reports only inild discomfort from the actual injection of Haldol.
(J.A. 225.)

Further, as found by the trial court, Mr. Perry does

not suffer any side effects from ta)cing Haldol.

(J.A. 285.)

Based upon the foregoing, it is very difficult to conclude that
forcible administration of Haldol is a wanton and unnecessary
infliction of pain.

Furthermore, forcibly medicating Mr. Perry

is not "grossly” disproportionate to the crime of murder where it
is used merely to achieve Mr. Perry's competence to face the
sentence rightfully imposed upon him.
Forcible medication of Mr. Perry comports with contemporary
standards of decency.

In his concurring opinion in Ford, Justice

Powell provides that "the modern practices of the States . . .
are indicative of our ‘evolving standards of decency.'"
477 U.S. at 419.

This Court in Gregg posits: "legislative

judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining such standards."
428 U.S. at 175.

Ford,

Gregg,

Thirty-two of the thirty-eight states which

provide statutory schemes concerning the "right to refuse
medication" permit forcible medication under varied
circumstances.

(J.A. 309-314.)

The legislative judgment of this

overwhelming majority of states compels the conclusion that
forcible medication comports with contemporary standards of
decency.
This Court recently upheld a state's right to forcibly
medicate to further a legitimate state interest.

Harper. 110 S.

Ct. at 1039-1040 (forcible medication of prisoner in the interest
25

of safety).

Numerous lower courts also have sanctioned the use

of forcible medication under a variety of circumstances,
V.

Klein, 653 F,2d 836 (1980)

Rennie

(forcible medication of mental

patient where patient is a danger to self and others);
District of Columbia, 567 F. Supp. 1026 (1983)

Osgood v.

(forcible

medication of jail inmate to protect safety of others);

State v.

Kaysen, 464 So.2d 793 (La. Ct. App. 1985), State v. Hampton, 218
So.2d 311 (La. 1969), State v. Plaisance, 211 So.2d 323 (La.
1968)

(competency to stand trial achieved through use of

prescribed medication).

Clearly, forcible medication comports

with contemporary standards of decency where used to further a
legitimate state interest.
CONCLUSION
This case presents an opportunity for this Court to explicitly
adopt Justice Powell's competency standard, requiring that the
defendant understand both the fact of his impending death and the
reasons for it.

The Court has already adopted this standard in

several recent decisions.

It is a fair standard because it

allays moral and philosophical concerns against a state executing
an insane inmate.

Mr. Perry demonstrates that he fulfills both

prongs of Justice Powell's test.

For example, Mr. Perry has

expressed that he does not want to die.

Further, Mr. Perry

comprehends that he will be executed for the murders he
committed.

A higher test would only encourage a barrage of false

claims of insanity.
Furthermore, the forcible medication of a convicted murderer
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to achieve competency to undergo execution is consistent with the
Due Process Clause, in view of a state's legitimate interest in
enforcing its criminal justice system.

Allowing a condemed

prisoner to avoid his lawful punishment by refusing antipsychotic
treatment would allow the prisoner to thwart the state's
legitimate interest.

Such a result clearly must not be intended

limited due process rights after conviction.

Moreover, forcible

medication, under the present circumstances, is consistent with
the eighth amendment because (1) it is the only effective
treatment, from Haldol.

Its comportment with evolving standards

of decency is demonstrated by the number of statutory schemes
adopting forcible medication, as well as the several cases
upholding such schemes.
For the foregoing reasons, we urge this Court to uphold the
Louisiana Supreme Court's holding that:

(1) the state may

forcibly medicate Mr. Perry for purposes of execution; and, (2)
the proper test to determine competency for execution is that the
defendant understand the nature of the death penalty and the
reason for it.
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Dated:

October 25, 1990.
Respectfully submitted,

